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In the European Union, the institutional reform that risk regulation system has 
undergone in the last decade has emphasised the need for fostering public par-
ticipation and stakeholder involvement in decision making processes. Citizen 
scrutiny, in theory, ought to bring about better governance, and greater partici-
pation in public policy decisions is usually regarded as a symptom of a healthy 
democracy. By presenting evidence from two case studies in the field of bio-
technology regulation, this paper aims to prove that taking participation as a 
tout court advantage is a mistake. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the participation of lay-
people in procedures of risk-management. The debate peaked in the 1980’s 
with the anti-nuclear movement, and again more recently as a reaction to the 
food scandals of the mid 1990’s. In the wake of the BSE crisis, there has been 
a proliferation of Community rules on the production, processing and retailing 
of food products, along with an augmentation of scientific committees in order 
to cope with increased regulatory demand. Parallel to the increase in regulatory 
density, a number of normative questions has been raised. One of the most per-
sistently raised questions is what place, if any, should lay people and their 
opinions be given in the processes of risk government. This issue is often put 
in terms of ‘democratisation of risk’, which leads to the claim that lay people 
ought to have input in two areas : firstly, in the risks they are willing to take, 
and secondly, in the regulatory procedures available to reduce such risks. 
Moreover, issues regarding risk mitigation and distribution across the popula-
tion should be subject to democratic assessment. 
Despite the fact that much has been written on the pros and cons of 
strengthening democratic participation in institutions for risk regulation, there 
seems to be little clarity on what ought to be the objectives of increased par-
ticipation. This paper argues that, in the literature, the demand for democratisa-
tion of risk regulation procedures often conflates two distinct, although corre-
lated, claims: 
i) Participatory claim: Broadening participation enhances democratic legi-
timacy, as it is an expression of self-governance. Risk is being imposed, 
through regulation, on people who have not consented to it. Public partici-
pation in decision making concerning risk, as well as the openness and 
transparency of the procedures of risk assessment and management, are 
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fundamental preconditions for granting democratic legitimacy to regulating 
bodies, insofar as they can exercise control on the decision makers, and 
themselves be part of the decision making process.  
ii) Epistemic claim: The inclusion of lay people in policy-making will lead 
to better output. Risk assessment is not a value-free enterprise, but presup-
poses value judgments. Deciding, for example, which risk to prioritise in 
assessment procedures, or how to gather and interpret data depends upon 
the values attributed to the various options at stake. In order to appropri-
ately interpret and understand these values lay people, as well as experts 
from outside the government, must be consulted. In this context the follo-
wing question arises: are the outcomes of decision making about risk justi-
fied rules (e.g. rules that appropriately mitigate the effects of risk, fairly 
distribute risk etc.)? 
Because there exists in the current literature a flourishing of interpretations of 
the meaning of legitimation and justification, and of their relations, in this es-
say I apply a distinction that is often used in contemporary political studies. 
Charles Taylor has described legitimacy as a function of the allegiance, loy-
alty, or identification of the citizens with the rulers and the rules of a given po-
litical community (Taylor, 1985). Thus legitimation speaks of the relations be-
tween the state authority and its subjects (Simmons, 1999). For this reason, 
when we talk about a ‘democratic deficit’ we refer to a lack of trust in public 
authorities and their representatives. Transparency, accountability and im-
proved participation may remedy this.  
Justification, instead, concerns rules and the reasons that stand behind them. 
It is not a matter of allegiance, rather the acknowledgment of such reasons that 
inform decisions by those affected by them. Such a consensus has been un-
derstood either as rational (agreement under ideal conditions per Habermas) or 
based on participation and actual assent (D’Agostino, 1996). 
When citizens can see that they are ruled by good (i.e., justified) laws, their 
relationship with those responsible for the making of those laws improves, and 
– arguably – legitimacy is thereby fostered. Yet the question of whether risk 
regulation will improve through lay participation may have two very different 
answers, depending on whether we refer to participatory or epistemic claims. 
Moreover, whether these practices can be a remedy to the democratic deficit, 
or rather improve the grounds (argument, methodology, evidence used etc.) on 
which public decisions rest, is a question of whether they address justification 
or legitimating problems. 
Although various authors have identified a plurality of tasks that are as-
signed to participatory practices (Shrader Frechette, 1991; Hood et al., 2000), 
many influential theorists insist that the two claims are interlinked rather than 
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distinct, and that they are two sides of the same coin. According to these au-
thors, through sustained effort to make well-informed decisions based on bal-
anced and competing arguments in which the public is involved, people are 
capable of recognising the reasons that support decision making outcomes, 
may form and reform their preferences, and thereby reduce the possibility of 
dissent (Fishkin, 2005). Supporters of deliberative democracy have established 
a strong link between the two claims, understanding the epistemic aim of de-
mocratic practices as not confined to the production of knowledge, but rather 
as also including the fostering of mutual understanding and the improvement 
of social interaction (Levison, 1992). 
However, I argue that keeping a distinction between participatory and epis-
temic claims, can foster a better understanding as to what we expect from de-
mocratic procedures and it clears the way for critical analysis of the procedures 
actually in place, and the identification of indicators for their evaluation. Both 
strengthening the legitimation of public institutions and improving justification 
of decision outcomes are important democratic goals, which may require pub-
lic participation and involvement (hereinafter “democratic practices”). Howe-
ver, there are several models of these practices that are embodied in our institu-
tions, and an evaluation of their relative merits will help us to choose the most 
effective.  
The context, the subject matter and, particularly, the goals that we set for 
our institutions determine what democratic practices we can best apply. More-
over, the implementation of democratic practices is a matter of degree or ex-
tent, and requires, inter alia, costs in terms of public resources, time, and ar-
guably, efficiency. By clarifying what we want from them, we will be in a bet-
ter position to determine what is worth our while.  
The following section considers each claim and explains their standing in 
this debate. Sections 3, 4 and 5 clarify the necessity of the distinction that I 
propose by discussing some examples in the field of risk regulation concerning 
novel biotechnologies in the European Union. The final section explains what 
bearing the distinction has on the way we think of justification and legitimacy 
of public regulation. 
2. Two different ideas of ‘democratic’ practices 
Initiatives for strengthening democratic participation are almost invariably 
looked upon with a favourable eye by practitioners (especially NGO’s and 
consumer associations), but also by many theorists (Hunold and Young, 1998). 
Yet, when moving from theory to practice, what purpose do these initiatives 
serve? I believe that the examination of the purposes of these practices is the 
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first necessary step to evaluating them. Although there may be a multiplicity of 
tasks implied in any initiative for lay involvement in decision making proc-
esses (and also for fostering openness, transparency and accountability), the 
two main motivations that I identify are those of enhancing legitimation and 
improving justification. 
a) Participatory claim 
The first claim, which I have referred to as the ‘participatory claim’, is the less 
specific of the two. Contemporary political theory has devoted great effort to 
advocating greater involvement of citizens in governance and participation in 
different areas of life within the community, and has argued that this contrib-
utes to the democratic legitimacy of public institutions (Hood et al., 2003). 
Citizens should be in a position to participate in decisions that affect them, and 
that have an important impact on their lives. Industrial societies are often re-
garded as deficient in this respect. 
In his description of industrial modernity as the age of ‘risk society’ Ulrich 
Beck identifies a ‘truncated democracy` in which democratic processes and po-
litical decision-making have surrendered to the dynamics of technological 
change. However, the risks and benefits inherent in technological applications 
and scientific innovation still affect every citizen, and it is a core democratic 
principle that all those affected by a certain decision ought to have levers of 
influence on the decision making process. In order to reclaim democratic 
control over scientific and technological progress, Beck calls for increased o-
penness towards the public, democratic accountability and participation in risk 
assessment and risk management (Beck, 1999). 
In the same vein, several scholars and practitioners contend that public con-
trol over government-mandated regulatory activities is a means of remedy for 
the lack of transparent regulatory appraisal that can evenly represent all social 
parties (Fiorino, 1989; Perhac, 1998, Munton, 2003).  
The reason why the problem of regulating risk has attracted such great at-
tention is that it represents a nodal point for exploring the tensions between the 
need to address technical difficulties, which seems to require experts, and the 
democratic commitment to find public rules and processes that are transparent 
and open to citizens for appraisal and scrutiny. The concern is that scientists 
may decide on policy issues, by disguising their power under technical decisi-
on making (Jasanoff, 1987: 225).  
In particular, advocates of a more democratic process of risk assessment see 
the current procedures as biased towards market interests (James et al., 1999: 
14; Hood et al., 2003: 100). In Europe, the BSE scandal has become the sym-
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bol of the failure of politics to take responsibility over regulatory issues, and 
ensure effective risk governance (Medina, 1997). The suspicion that the judg-
ment of the appointed experts served the interests of the meat industry, rather 
than those of consumers, has been used as evidence that science was biased, 
not very transparent and therefore a legitimate object of scepticism. As a 
means of remedy, the Commission’s White Paper on Food Safety (2000) states 
the intention to “promote dialogue with consumers to encourage their invol-
vement in food safety policy” (12). The commitment to a greater civic partici-
pation, transparency and openness was put forward as a way to give consumer 
interests a new centrality (Vogel, 2001: 16). 
Citizens, it is argued, are disenchanted and reclaim transparency in decision 
making, greater accountability of appointed experts, but also express a concern 
for the selection process of these experts, and the possible conflict of interests 
that may thus arise. For example, it is often contested that several of the ap-
pointed experts had previously worked for companies that have direct stakes in 
regulatory outcomes (Hood et al., 2003: 112-132).  
For these reasons, practices designed to enhance transparency, openness, 
accountability and the independence of the regulative processes are increasing 
in popularity1, and are normally considered a step towards more democratic 
institutions. These practices, arguably, bring citizens close to the institutions, 
and empower the consumers who would otherwise be at risk of domination by 
the other stakeholders, such as the industry. To what extent these goals can be 
met will be the object of the discussion in the following sections. 
b) Epistemic claim 
The claim that I have referred to as ‘epistemic’ is stronger and more specific 
than the generic claim that public processes and institutions should be an ex-
pression of self-governance. Instead, it pertains to the nature of risk assessment 
itself: from the organisation of risk assessment we move to the substantive 
question of how we should assess risk and whether the public should partici-
pate in the assessment. In order to have justified rules we need to have good 
rules, and some authors hold that lay people can contribute to produce better 
regulation by bringing to the decision making process experiences, reasons and 
perspectives that experts would not otherwise consider (Wynne, 1987). 
                                                 
1 Falke (2002) has shown that commitments to openness and transparency, accountabil-
ity, responsibility and independence are shared by several food regulation authorities 
(he considers the UK, Canada, The Netherlands, France, US and Germany). 
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According to the traditional positivist approach, it is possible to give an ob-
jective measure of risk, and to exclude all normative elements, so that risk 
evaluation is an enterprise that can appropriately be left to experts and scien-
tists (Lowarance, 1976). In the last decades, the critics of this approach have 
outnumbered its supporters, and the role of evaluative judgments has been 
taken into serious consideration. “Hazards”, it has been argued, “are threats to 
people and what they value as risk are the measurement of the hazards” (Kates 
and Kasperson, 1983). Risk assessment implies a judgment of what risks are 
acceptable, or negligible. Yet the thresholds of acceptability or negligibility are 
not absolute. Sociological reserach has shown, for example, that people tend to 
consider risky situations that are unfamiliar and where new technologies are 
involved as less acceptable (Lash, 2000). As such, risk assessment cannot be a 
value-free enterprise, but we need judgments on which risks should be subject 
to assessment, on the methodology in place and on how various possible out-
comes should be evaluated (Thompson and Dean, 1996). For this reason, the 
role of scientific expertise should be sized down to leave more room to the lay 
public, and let people express what is a risk to them, abandoning the dualism 
between ‘perceived risk ‘ and ‘real risk’. 
This approach has the indubitable merit of pointing to the fact that metho-
dological choices and debates on which kind of risk should be subject to regu-
lative procedure are a matter of high relevance, which should not be reduced to 
a technical matter or subtracted to the political sphere. Yet it seems unfair to 
state, as Slovic (2003), for one, does, that at present there is little scientific a-
wareness of the coexistence of many alternative methods for the calculation of 
probability. Methodological conflicts among risk assessors about the best indi-
cators for the assessment of the probability (or the criteria for choosing a theo-
ry of probability against another) for gathering and interpreting data, ranking 
competing kinds of risk involved in a same course of action under conditions 
of great uncertainty are very well known and debated and are part of a wider 
debate over the validity of scientific knowledge (Shrader Frechette, 1991; 
Lucas, 2002; Hansson, 1996). As Giddens observes: “Characteristics of the 
new situation is that the experts disagree with each other. Rather than there 
being a clear-cut set of findings to turn to for policy-makers, research genera-
tes ambiguous conclusions and disputed interpretations” (1998: 59).  
The core of the epistemic question is not whether there is or there is not a 
plurality of technical methodologies, but rather how we can go from that plu-
rality to a collective action (i.e. the choice of regulatory procedure), and 
whether strategies for public involvement effectively improve the decision 
making process from an epistemic perspective. The claim that there is no 
value-free conception of risk should not lead us to conclude that ‘anything 
goes’, otherwise we would have to also accept that risk and risk regulation can 
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only be imposed, but not justified. In other words, we would not be able to say 
that one regulatory framework is preferable to another. Instead, the evaluative 
aspects of risk regulation point to the fact that decisions involve judgments of 
justice.  
According to some, the appropriate methodologies should include some 
strategies for public involvement. This is part of the more general idea that the 
exchange of information and views, as well as the processes of self-reflection 
have a positive impact on decision outcomes. Some authors (Majone, 1989; 
Wynne and Irwin, 1996) have suggested that the epistemic aspect of participa-
tion has to do with the necessity to include information and insight coming 
from experts outside the government appointed committee and agencies, so as 
to improve the epistemic outcome of decision making (e.g. to make more accu-
rate prediction of risk, or to manage it more efficiently).2 The outcome of deci-
sion making must be vindicated and justified as epistemically sound before a 
wider community. Stakeholders can challenge decisions, not only with evi-
dence-based material, but also with objections founded in value considerations, 
against which decisions makers have to defend their positions. Including lay 
people in the decision process is thought of as adding another perspective to 
the issues at stake (Wynne 1987). This, arguably, aims at delivering rationally 
acceptable results (Habermas, 1990; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996), and im-
proving the epistemic quality of the process. 
In summary, the second claim is that in order to have valid tools for deci-
sion making, risk-assessment needs to be practiced not only in a transparent 
and open manner by using the most up to date scientific knowledge and ex-
perience, but it also requires a democratic involvement in order to make possi-
ble impartial decisions on what can be the principled choices for specific kinds 
of risk. To what extent such an involvement can effectively serve the democ-
ratic ideal of justification remains to be discussed. 
The thesis that I put forward in the remainder of this paper is that, although 
we should be concerned both with the legitimacy of our democratic institutions 
and with the justification of the substantial rules and decisions that are genera-
ted by those institution, it would be a mistake to take legitimacy and justifica-
tion as one problem that requires one single solution. There is a plurality of 
models available for structuring public participation and involvement into in-
                                                 
2 Rothstein (2004) opposes this epistemic aspect to a ‘normative’ aspect of participa-
tion, which on his account reflects the fact that risk assessment has to do with value 
judgments and therefore is not value-free. I think that such a distinction fails to cap-
ture the normative aspects involved in many decisions (such as methodological 
choices) that are apparently of an epistemic nature. 
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stitutional regulatory practices, and only by clarifying what we expect from 
these practices we will be able to decide which are the most appropriate and 
effective in enhancing our goals. 
3. Risk assessment in the EU: the case of EFSA  
In order to illustrate my point, I propose looking to the EFSA (European Food 
Safety Authority), and to the scientific panel on genetically modified organ-
isms (GMO Panel), which is the body within the EFSA that deals with novel 
biotechnologies – perhaps the most debated risk issue in recent years.  
The EFSA was instituted with European Parliament and Council Regulation 
178/2002/EC of 28 January 2002 (laying down the general principles and re-
quirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and 
laying down procedures in matters of food safety) as a response to the food 
scandals and international trade disputes of the 1990’s, and the subsequent ac-
cusations of a mismanagement of risk at European level. 
In particular, concerning genetically modified products, critics of the Euro-
pean regulatory approach, especially from the other side of the Atlantic, see the 
issue as highly politicised and as giving too much weigh to ‘passions’ and 
‘fears’ rather than ‘sound science’ with public and non-governmental organisa-
tions playing a very influential role (Vogel, 2001, 4). On the other hand, Euro-
pean public opinion, and especially environmentalist NGO’s, criticise the mar-
ginal role given to consumers and their opinions at institutional level.  
The institution of the EFSA as an independent scientific agency was in-
tended to meet the demand for sound and independent scientific advice with 
the task of risk assessment, whilst the task of risk management, which explic-
itly involves political choices, was left to the national authorities and the Euro-
pean Commission (Lafond, 2001). The EFSA’s competences encompass all 
matters linked to food and feed safety including animal health and welfare, 
plant protection, nutrition and risk communication. The EFSA has no regula-
tory competences of its own, but deals principally with requests for risk as-
sessments from the European Commission, and its mandate includes promot-
ing studies and research on safety issues of its own initiative, collecting and 
analysing scientific data and offering support to the Commission in case of a 
food crisis. Moreover it can communicate directly with the public.  
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EFSA’s GMO Panel 
The EFSA’s Scientific GMO Panel deals with questions of genetically modi-
fied organisms as defined in Directive 2001/18/EC (regulating a deliberate re-
lease into the environment of GMO’s) and 2003/1829/EC (regulating GM food 
and feed). In particular, it plays an important role in the procedures for authori-
sation of GMO’s and has the task of expressing opinions on the deliberate re-
lease into the environment, and the marketing of genetically modified food and 
feed, which includes their derived products. The two directives set two differ-
ent (although similar) procedures for authorisation. 
For authorisations under Directive 2001/18/EC (deliberate release into the 
environment), companies send a dossier application to a national authority, 
which will lead the assessment procedure. The competent authority notifies the 
application to the Commission and the Member States and a summary notifica-
tion (SNIF) is made available to the public. After evaluating the dossier the 
competent authority publishes an assessment report. Within 30 days of publi-
cation of both the summary notification and of the assessment report, the gen-
eral public is invited to send comments, via a website (http://gmoinfo.jrc.it, 
hereinafter Gmoinfo) provided by the Joint Research Centre of the Commis-
sion (based in Ispra, Italy) with the support of DG Environment. It must be 
noted that the aim of the website is to inform the public, and to manage the in-
formation flow concerning specific assessment reports between the competent 
agencies and the public. EC legislation rules that public comments should be 
taken in ‘due consideration’ by the competent authority. However, the form 
due consideration should take is entirely left to the national authority initiative 
(for further discussion see Ferretti, 2006). 
In case other Member States advance objections to the opinion of the au-
thority leading the notification, a procedure of conciliation is initiated, with the 
aim of arriving at a consensual decision. If divergences persist, the dossier ap-
plication is then passed on to the EFSA, which carries out a risk assessment on 
the basis of the notification dossier. Once the EFSA issues an opinion, the 
Commission prepares a draft decision to be submitted to the Regulatory Com-
mittee in Brussels. The Regulatory Committee is comprised of representatives 
of national governments, which through qualified majority vote can accept or 
reject the proposal of the Commission. When the Committee expresses a fa-
vourable opinion, the Commission shall adopt the decision. In case the meas-
ures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, or no 
opinion is delivered, the Commission submits its proposal to the Council of 
Ministers for approval (or rejection) under qualified majority voting. If on the 
expiring of three months no majority vote is obtained in favour of or against 
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the authorisation, the proposed legal act shall be adopted by the Commission 
(Directive 2003/1829). 
The procedure in place for authorisation under 2003/1829/EC (food and 
feed) gives a more central role to the EFSA, which is in charge of risk assess-
ment. Companies apply by sending a dossier application (or notification) to a 
national authority, which then refers the application to the EFSA. The applica-
tion is made available to the other Member States and the Commission, and a 
summary of the application dossier is also published on the EFSA’s website. 
After evaluating the application documents and requesting further information 
when necessary, the EFSA publishes an opinion. Based on this opinion the 
Commission shall adopt a decision, having once submitted it for approval to 
the Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health (chaired by DG 
SANCO) comprised of representatives of the Member States. Also, in such a 
case, the public can make comments to the Commission on the overall final o-
pinion expressed by the EFSA on a web page made available by the GM Food 
and Feed Unit (DG SANCO). In this case all comments are published on the 
same webpage, and the Commission is committed to give to the comments 
‘due consideration’, but also to make comments available to the competent na-
tional authorities that can take them into consideration in their review of the 
application. 
In accepting (or rejecting) authorisations, the Commission has to take into 
account the EFSA’s opinion and justify any decision that diverges from the 
line of action suggested by the EFSA. 
In the next two sections, I shall discuss two cases of procedures for authori-
sation that I believe are useful in exploring the potentialities and limitations of 
the participatory practices in place within this context. 
4. Participatory claim: MON 863 
Participation is considered by some (Benhabib, 1996; Fishkin, 2005) as a rem-
edy to the hegemony that some groups entertain in the decision making proc-
ess. In this sense, promoting participation means redressing the structural ine-
qualities inscribed in the decision making process. In particular, it is within the 
remit of the EFSA to give to consumers their due place so that they can defend 
their interests. As explained in section 2, in the case of food safety, the objec-
tive of counterbalancing the interests of science by giving more space to the 
consumer was one of the highlights of the White Paper on Food Safety (2000), 
which corresponds to what I called a “participatory claim”. Are the institu-
tional mechanisms for the participation of the public in the authorization proc-
ess of GMO products an efficient means to this end? 
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Procedures for authorisation include a model of participation that is to give 
‘due consideration’ to the arguments of all relevant stakeholders.3 When an 
application dossier is notified to the competent authority, all interested parties 
are invited to contribute facts and evidence in order to express their opinion on 
the submitted document and, when they judge it opportune, to rebut the argu-
ments presented by the applicant on the basis of fact, evidence and argument. 
The competent authority should act as a neutral arbiter between the parties, ap-
praise the evidence and arguments brought to the decision table and pronounce 
a verdict. In this system it is not expected, as in many deliberative practices, 
that actors change their preferences through information, dialogue and mutual 
learning (Elster, 1998; Fishkin, 1991), but instead everyone defends their own 
case, and the verdict establishes winners and losers, without space for mediati-
on and conciliation (McGarity, 1990; Ferretti, 2006). The underlying principle 
is that the best argument wins, and the competent agency decides what counts 
as the best argument, by following the basic rules of logic, but also the guideli-
nes established to advise the process such as the legal framework, or in this 
specific case, the agreed guidelines for risk assessment. 
In this model, the agenda is shaped by those who prepare the docu-
ment/proposal to be submitted for appraisal to the interested parties. In the case 
of application for authorisation, the dossier, although following a standard 
format requested by the Community, is produced by the applicant company. 
The rationale is to ensure ex-ante accountability and to put the strains of justi-
fication on the applicant. However, this also puts the company in an advanta-
geous position compared to the parties, as the quality and organisation of the 
information submitted to the competent authorities are selected by the appli-
cant. Although the EFSA and the national authorities are in a position to re-
quest additional information on the application dossier, or to object to the in-
formation provided, time limits and the right to commercial secrecy often pre-
vent a thorough investigation of possible elements against a positive result of 
the application. 
Data contained in dossier applications is based on studies commissioned by 
the applicant company, even if it often rely upon information produced by 
third parties on the company’s request. Paradoxically, the applicant companies 
are in the best position to put their products to test. This is primarily because 
they can attract scientists of excellence and employ vast resources. Additional-
                                                 
3 McGarity (1990) in his taxonomy of participatory practices identifies six public par-
ticipation models: the exclusionary model; the confrontational model, the adversarial 
model; the due consideration model; the mediation model; and the advisory committee 
model.  
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ly, being in charge of the presentation of data and materials, the company can 
conceal unfavourable evidence and information. Although the EFSA can deci-
de to conduct tests on the product, it relies predominantly on the applicant’s 
source of information. Consequently, the influence of the company on the is-
sues to be discussed is conspicuous. I shall argue that such an institutional ar-
chitecture leaves lay people in a situation of structural inequality, especially in 
comparison to the applicant company. 
The case of pesticide resistant maize MON 863 is instructive in this sense. 
Put briefly, in the summer 2002 Monsanto submitted an application for the 
registration of genetically modified MON 863 to the competent German au-
thorities. MON 863 is a variant of maize (Zea mays), genetically modified in 
order to produce pesticide, and in particular the toxin CryBb1. Being different 
from toxins produced by other GMO products previously evaluated by EC au-
thorities, it begs special attention due to its toxicological characteristics. The 
application dossier included a 90 days sub-chronic study on rodents, prepared 
by a third party and commissioned by Monsanto, subsequently updated to fulfil 
the requirements of the European authorities.4 
As part of Member States’ review of the dossier assessment, some national 
authorities requested further information on the results of the study, which was 
provided by the applicant by issuing some new data analysis and evaluations of 
the rodent-based testing.5 Given the discordant evaluations of the competent 
national authorities, the EFSA was required to express an opinion, which was 
issued in April 2004, concluding that on the basis of the documents acquired, 
the product is unlikely to cause adverse effects on human and animal health or 
on the environment, and that the information provided by the applicant satis-
factorily addressed the outstanding questions of the national authorities.  
In September 2004 the Regulatory Committee discussed a draft of the 
Commission decision to authorise the placement of the GM maize on the mar-
ket. Due to a new evaluation of the rat study by German authorities, already 
reviewed by the EFSA Panel, the European Commission decided to postpone a 
vote on MON 863 maize, and the EFSA was asked to reconsider the case of 
                                                 
4 13 week Dietary Subchronic Comparison Study with MON 863 Corn in Rats Preceded 
by a 1 – Week Baseline Food Consumption Determination with PMI Certified Rodent 
Diet #5002. (OECD Protocol 408), Covance Study No. 6l03-293, issued 17th Decem-
ber 2002.  
5 Retrospective Evaluation of Renal Tissues and data from Monsanto Co. Study CV – 
2000 – 260 (MSL 18175): a 13 week Rat Feeding Study with MON 863 Corn, (Co-
vance Laboratories Study No 6103-293); Supplemental Analysis of Selected Findings 
on the Rat 90-day Feeding Study with MON 863 Maize, Report MSL – 18175; 
Hammond, B.G. and Ward, D.P., Monsanto Co., USA, 24th May 2004. 
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MON 863 in the light of this new evaluation. The subject of the disagreement 
was the statistical relevance of some of the rat study results. After scientific re-
valuation the EFSA concluded that the new evidence provided did not change 
the assessment outcomes, and in October 2004 the EFSA reaffirmed its opin-
ion, according to which there is no concern about the safety of the product, and 
on the quality of its nutritional properties. 
The representatives of the Member States in the Regulatory Committee 
could not reach a qualified voting decision on MON 863, and thus the Com-
mission submitted its proposal to the Council. Since on the expiring of the pe-
riod laid down by Art. 30 (2) of Directive 2001/18/EC the Council had neither 
adopted the proposed measures nor indicated its opposition to them, the Com-
mission on 8 August 2005 adopted the Decision 2005/608/CE favourable to 
the placing on the market of MON 863. Some independent experts are how-
ever currently processing the data made available by Monsanto so as to prove 
the inadequacy of the statistical interpretations provided and accepted by the 
EFSA (see for example Seralini, 2005). 
While the Member States were called to express an opinion on the case, in 
the Spring of 2005 the attention of the public was newly drawn by the media to 
some statistical results of Monsanto’s rat study, from which allegedly signifi-
cant differences emerge between control rats and treated rats. The British 
newspaper The Independent revealed that a Monsanto’s internal scientific re-
port at the US-based company contained data on kidney malformations and 
damages to the immune system observed in rats fed with the crop. A massive 
mobilisation of public opinion and environmentalist NGO’s followed. 
Monsanto’s representatives replied that the differences revealed by the 
study are not statistically significant, and in response to public concerns, stated 
that MON 863 is not a new product, and that there is no record of health prob-
lems associated with the product’s consumption. Moreover, they stated that the 
product has already been approved as equally safe as conventional maize by 
various food authorities in the world, including the U.S. and Canada. 
The debate about the safety of MON 863 was exacerbated by Monsanto’s re-
fusal to make public the study results in full, on grounds of commercial secrecy. 
Under pressure from environmentalist NGO’s, lead by Greenpeace, the German 
authorities compelled Monsanto to make the document available on the basis of 
Art. 25 of Directive 2001/18/EC, according to which risk assessment in envi-
ronmental and health matters should be open to public scrutiny. Monsanto ap-
pealed against the decision to disclose the document, but in June 2005 the higher 
administrative court in Münster ordered the study to be released.  
This case invites important reflections on the role that the applicant compa-
nies play in the authorisation process, and their power position in relation to 
  14
other interested parties. The evidence produced by the applicant, and in parti-
cular the aforementioned rat study, was effectively submitted to the scrutiny of 
the interested parties. The competent authorities were able to ask for further 
information and evidence to be considered in the authorisation process. Howe-
ver, the applicant was given the prerogative of publishing selected findings on-
ly, protected by the principle of commercial secrecy. Greenpeace, which led 
the public campaign for transparency, objected in its reports on MON 863 (see, 
for example, Seralini, 2005) that the publication of selected data only ran a-
gainst the public interest. Thus, the publication of the summary application and 
assessment report makes decision makers more accountable to the public, as 
they have to justify their evaluations of the case. Yet, when moving from the 
matter of transparency to the most pressing problem of whether the study re-
sults actually provided evidence of the safety of the product, Greenpeace itself 
had only Monsanto’s study to rely on.  
From this, it emerges that in order to redress the imbalance of power among 
different stakeholder groups it is not enough to grant public participation, but 
asymmetries in information should be targeted. Corporate dominance is one of 
the factors that most contributes to the negative attitude that Europeans have 
towards novel biotechnologies (Bernauer, 2003). The dominance of multina-
tionals derives not from a privileged access to the decision making process, but 
from the role the industry plays in the production and management of the in-
formation. Public participation strategies can hardly break such dominance. 
The method of ‘due consideration’ offers lay people the possibility to partici-
pate. It also creates the impression that all interested parties are given a fair 
chance in the decision making process, but it is hardly possible that lay people 
can give a contribution that is as weighty as that of the applicant company 
which largely leads the whole process. Thus, people are shown that they could 
take part in the decisional process, but also that the case is ‘won’ by other ac-
tors that can produce better arguments and evidence. The authority can claim 
legitimacy for its decisions (which is ultimately a political one), as the process 
has included all stakeholders, even if, in fact, the applicant company predomi-
nates in the process that leads to a scientific opinion on authorisation, and the 
procedures for public participation in place are not effective in breaking such 
dominance, which is inscribed in the institutional design itself. 
5. Epistemic claim: Florigene Moonlight 
From the epistemic point of view, supporters of democratic practices hold that 
lay people can proficiently contribute with their view, ideas, information and 
evidence to improve the outcome of the decision making.  
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In the case of procedures for authorisation for the marketing of GMO prod-
ucts, the comments of the public are invited through the already mentioned 
Gmoinfo website and electronically recorded. I propose to look into comments 
regarding a particular summary notification (SNIF) and the assessment report 
produced by the competent authority. This allows us the opportunity to observe 
the mechanism of due consideration in greater detail. Since most national au-
thorities simply do not include any section on public comments in their as-
sessment report, I have selected one case, Florigene Moonlight (C/NL/04/02), 
where public comments are summarised and addressed. A further reason for 
selecting this case is that the entire body of comments was made available to 
me by DG Environment. From an in-depth qualitative analysis of these com-
ments and the relative answers provided by the competent authority, it is pos-
sible to probe into the adequacy of this institutional mechanism of participation 
in order to inform the decision making process by means of insights coming 
from laypeople. In other words, it is possible to assess to what extent they can 
contribute to better decision, from an epistemic point of view. 
In September 2004, Florigene Limited (Australia) applied under Directive 
2001/18/EC to the competent authority of the Netherlands (Dutch Scientific 
Advisory Committee, or COGEM) for the import and marketing Florigene 
Moonlight carnations. This carnation variety has a modified flower colour and 
contains an herbicide-resistant gene. The scope of the notification did not in-
clude authorisation for consumption or cultivation, and the product was in-
tended for ornamental use only. The competent Dutch authority (COGEM) 
judged all risks to the environment or human health to be negligible.  
Six comments on the summary notification were sent from four different 
member states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK). In its assessment 
report, COGEM only addresses the three comments originating from the Neth-
erlands, and specifies that other comments should be addressed by the other 
Member States’ competent authorities during their national assessment. This is 
however an interpretation of the directive which is not based on any official 
document. The directive does not specify the competent authority that should 
give ‘due consideration’. The procedure, according to which Member States, 
should take into consideration the comments issued by their nationals, devel-
oped from the practical need of avoiding language barriers, even though most 
comments are issued in English. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
competent authorities of the interested Member States actually addressed 
comments from their nationals, nor are they required to produce evidence that 
they have taken comments into consideration (Consiglio dei Diritti Genetici, 
2005).  
The three ‘Dutch’ comments for which COGEM takes responsibility, are ad-
dressed in the assessment report, and are dismissed on the basis that the objec-
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tions raised go beyond the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC. However it is inter-
esting, I believe, to take a closer look to the concerns expressed by consumers. 
Two of the comments concern whether it was worth running any risk in or-
der to have, say, carnations of a different colour. In the words of one of the 
people who commented on SNIF C/NL/04/02: “Are you crazy? As if nature is 
not beautiful enough”. Another comment, sent after the publication of the as-
sessment report asked, rhetorically, whether there were no more urgent tasks 
that scientist should address other than modifying flower colour. Although 
these comments are dismissed as ‘ideological’ in the reply provided by CO-
GEM, it seems plausible to interpret them as expressing an evaluation of risk 
versus benefits, and conclude that even the minimum risk is not worth taking 
in order to have carnations of a different colour. And who can we deem as 
foolish for thinking so?  
In the same vein, someone else suggested that GM products should only be 
used in cases of necessity, there being no available alternatives, and “modifica-
tion of flower colour is not a legitimate ground”. It is a request on good 
grounds to justify that GMO’s are needed, which can be easily read as a criti-
cism to the principle of substantial equivalence that “embodies the concept that 
if a new food or food component is found to be substantially equivalent to an 
existing food or food component, it can be treated in the same manner with re-
spect to safety (i.e., the food or food component can be concluded to be as safe 
as the conventional food or food component)” (FAO/WTO, 1996: 4). This 
principle has been the object of various scientific controversies, pointing 
mainly to the absence of an appropriate definition of the concept of equiva-
lence (Millstone et al., 1999).  
The Competent Agency of the Netherlands is correct in asserting that all 
these concerns fall outside the standards set by Directive 2001/18/EC. How-
ever these restrictions imposed by legislation raise doubts about the capacity of 
the participation mechanism to capture what people take to be a risk, and the 
relevant considerations in its regulation. In fact, there is no institutionalised 
procedure that channels these comments towards other fora where they can be 
discussed for what they are, namely the ideas that lay people have of GMOs 
and their applications. It is probable that there is something of value, at least 
for the sake of risk communication and risk management to be learned from 
these comments, however naive they may look at first sight. In any case, it is a 
waste of resources to solicit comments that will be most likely ignored or 
quickly dismissed.  
To this it must be added that the competent authority is always in a position 
to reply to comments, even when they are technically pertinent, by stating that 
the objections raised have been appropriately taken into consideration in the 
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process of risk assessment, and there is no way for the public to verify whether 
this actually has occurred, since there exists no formal requirement to explain 
how comments have been taken into consideration. In fact, to the objections of 
possible dispersal into the environment of Florigene Moonlight, COGEM ans-
wered that the question had already been raised and no relevant risk had been 
identified.  
The most structured and, arguably, most compelling arguments seem to be 
those originating not from the lay-public, but from associations that can recruit 
scientists with the competence to assess the reports. Looking at the various 
SNIF published by Gmoinfo, comments written by lay people have decreased 
in number and, instead, emanate from specialised actors (mainly NGO’s) that 
attempt to enter into dialogue with the other institutional actors (Consiglio dei 
Diritti Genetici, 2005). Within the time limit of thirty days laid down by the 
regulation, the public should find the means and resources to challenge the 
opinions of the competent authority and the claims of the applicant company, 
considering also the limited information published on the summary notification 
(due, for example, to the protection of sensitive information and commercial 
secrecy), and this requires both expertise and resources to fund that expertise. 
The Gmoinfo forum has been progressively colonised by specialised non-profit 
organisations, whose aim is to facilitate public participation, and to overcome 
the obstacles to people’s engagement with questions relating to GMO’s, 
namely the difficulty in collecting the necessary information from the various 
European Institutions involved (DG Environment, DG SANCO; EFSA etc.), in 
translating the technicalities of the official documents into a language widely 
accessible, and to voice potential citizen dissatisfaction about the ways in 
which the institutionalised spaces for participation are managed. These organi-
sations have the self-appointed role of defending the interests of citizens and 
giving them guarantees against the political misuses of science. 
However, even with the assistance of scientists outside the institutional 
framework, meaningful participation is a hard task. The reports published by 
these NGO’s on this notification (see, for example, the Consiglio dei Diritti 
Genetici, 2005) highlight the limits of scientific work that can be performed on 
a summary notification that lacks some important technical details, including a 
bibliography. In other words, summary reports are too technical to be acces-
sible to lay people, and not detailed enough to allow for a sound scientific ap-
praisal by independent scientists.  
Once we look into specific practices of public participation we see that EC 
legislation requires participation, but its indeterminacy makes it rather imprac-
ticable or ineffective, and it seems legitimate to ask whether it is worth our 
while to accept and collect comments from the public if we do not know what 
to do with them. The alleged debate between experts and the public has, in 
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fact, a structure that is not dialogical at all. In an equal dialogue all the deba-
ting parts should have a right to an equal contribution (in terms of time limits 
and number of contributions), so as to institutionalise the opportunities for 
“discursive challenge” (Warren, 1996: 5). But this is not the case in the above 
described ‘due consideration’ approach. The public comment process tends to 
be a mere formality to comply with a legal requirement, and it is in fact a one 
way communication from the public to the authorities, which have no obligati-
on to reply. The decreasing number of comments sent to the Gmoinfo website 
suggests a declining interest from the part of citizens, or even a sense that ef-
fective interaction with the institutions remains very limited.  
Data on access to the website shows that, when a new report is published, 
there is a peak of visitors, which indicates that the initiative contributes to pub-
lic information. Access to data, mailing lists and e-mail pages where NGO’s 
can communicate both with the institutions and with the public have certainly 
contributed positively to keeping people informed and promoting openness in 
the decision making process. Information is indeed a very important aspect of 
participation (Hanna, 2000). 
But beyond openness, transparency and accountability what does participa-
tion contribute to? Proponents of lay participation hold that, at least in the case 
of environmental regulation, lay people can contribute to risk assessment by 
recounting their experiences (for example, as people who live next to a nuclear 
plant would) that are precluded from experts (Wynne, 1987). However, most 
empirical studies in support of this thesis take into consideration ‘collaborative 
dialogue’ among stakeholders and authorities in questions of local environ-
mental policy (Connick and Innes, 2003; Fisher, 2002). Other studies on delib-
eration are not so optimistic about participation. From a strictly epistemic per-
spective broadening participation, improving public information, or even al-
lowing a pluralism of methodologies to be employed by rival experts is not in 
fact effective, as it produces more indeterminate outcomes than solutions of-
fered. Accordingly, a more inclusive risk assessment process is no more robust 
than that of a closed process (Rothstein, 2004). Moreover, one of the most in-
sistent claims of supporters of deliberative democracy (or at least of some ac-
counts of it) is that public participation leads to better policy outcomes not be-
cause it improves the substance of decision making, but rather because it 
makes people more motivated to accept those outcomes, or at least to attenuate 
dissent (Fishkin, 2005). Via public participation people are put in a position 
enabling them to express their opinions, and to listen to the concerns of others, 
hopefully also to see the reasons that inform the decision process. In other 
words also the justification claim can be reduced to the legitimation claim.  
Yet, the suggestion that the participatory practices discussed in this paper 
confer legitimation to the decision-making process is far from obvious. The 
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frustration generated by the under-specified requirement of ‘due consideration’ 
and the creation of an appearance of consensus in situations in which diver-
gences of opinion remains, can foster disaffection with the institution rather 
than enhance allegiance. An obvious expression of people’s lack of trust in the 
possibility to influence the system from within is that in Europe protests about 
GMOs have reverted to the streets or other non-institutional settings. Public 
participants give their epistemic contributions only in forms that bypass the 
technical and legal frameworks set within the procedures for risk assessment, 
such as NGO’s WebPages and open letters to the competent authorities, but 
also in protest movements and demonstrative action, such as the destruction of 
GMO test sites that attract media attention and have remarkable societal im-
pact. 
6. Conclusions 
Citizen scrutiny is supposed to bring about better governance, and a greater 
participation in public policy decisions is usually regarded as a sign of good 
and dynamic democracy. In this paper, I have explained how participation is 
thought of as a means of to conferring legitimacy to public institutions, but also 
of providing a better epistemic justification to decision making outcomes. 
However, when we look at particular practices we understand that organising 
effective participation is, in reality, extremely difficult. Even more difficult is 
achieving the goal of improved justification and enhanced legitimation under 
the same institutional settings. To be sure, participation is no magic wand that 
can solve, at once, the problem of a democratic deficit, and ensure better sci-
ence. In fact, the opposite can often occur: in some cases participation can in-
crease institutional inefficiency, generate frustration and mistrust, and even 
anger among the public, or simply waste precious public resources. 
Two case studies do not allow for generalisations, but can be useful as a 
probe of what happens to our democratic ideals once they are put into operati-
on at an institutional level. The observed participatory practices are not ap-
propriate to overcome the problem of power asymmetry among the various 
stakeholders, as the case of MON 863 illustrated. Taking the challenge of more 
inclusive decision making seriously requires targeting the structural inequali-
ties of actors. This would require, for example, finding a viable solution to the 
problem of commercial secrecy, but also a larger investment of resources so 
that NGO experts can compete on an equal footing with those of the industry. 
And in order to democratically justify such expenditure of public money we 
would need better reasons than simply broadening participation per se. In fact, 
supporters of democratic practices would argue that it can be expected that de-
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cision making would also improve. 
However, once we separate the epistemic aspects from the democratic claim 
that people alone should decide (self-governance), it is difficult to make the 
case that technical agencies need lay participation in order to work at their 
best. It was shown that lay people cannot actually take part in the scientific de-
cision making, but rather they would need experts who defend their interests 
versus experts who are biased towards others’ interests. But then why should 
we subsidise (whether directly or indirectly) NGO experts to perform such a 
task? I think that we all agree that impartially defending the interests of all citi-
zens is what we expect from government appointed experts. 
In the field of novel biotechnologies, participation is more meaningful at a 
more general level, where people have to decide on the general principle gui-
ding their (public) attitude towards GM products, the methods and procedures 
for their assessment. Generally people are for or against a particular applicati-
on of biotechnology (e.g. genetically modified food or medical applications), 
rather than pro or contra the authorisation of a specific product. These general 
views about biotechnologies can find more adequate expression at the political 
level where values, principles and lines of action (rather than scientific techni-
calities) are discussed. 
Early stage stakeholders’ involvement at the time of the definition of 
Community initiatives, as required, for example, by the SANCO scoping pa-
pers, is a promising initiative in this respect. These are thought of as docu-
ments containing all the relevant information for discussion, launch and deve-
lopment of a Commission initiative (e.g. guidelines, legislation, expenditure of 
public funds) before it is submitted for approval; they are designed to find a 
clearer focus on the objectives to be achieved with a particular initiative, and 
on the policy options available. At this stage it is more likely that consumer as-
sociations and NGO’s can make meaningful contributions by discussing the 
possible economic, environmental and social impact of the proposed initiatives 
and their policy alternatives. 
In conclusion, the equation that more participation equals more democracy 
does not hold. In order to find an institutional place for our democratic ideals 
we need to look closer at alternative practices available, and find criteria to 
establish their relative merits. In this direction, I believe, supporters of delibe-
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